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NOTES
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE:




Isabella is a hard-working mother of two who immigrated to
the United States from Honduras three years ago and has been
granted "lawful permanent resident" status. She has held a
steady job as a cashier at a gas station for the duration of her
time in the country. She is also involved with the community
church and has many friends in the area. Her husband, who lost
his job because of the economic downturn, asked her to look the
other way while he took some gasoline without paying so that he
could drive to a job interview a few towns away. She reluctantly
agreed because she knew it could help her family. At the end of
the month, the manager noticed the discrepancy in the receipts
and confronted Isabella. Being the honest person that she is,
Isabella confessed to her manager. Her manager reported her to
the police, she was prosecuted for embezzlement, and she
received a sentence of six months probation. Shortly after
sentencing, she received a notice to appear in immigration court
for deportation proceedings because she had been convicted of a
"crime involving moral turpitude."
The preceding hypothetical is a very real situation that
many immigrants face. After substantial periods of time legally
residing within the United States, they face removal proceedings
for what are sometimes rather benign violations of the law.
Much to the disadvantage of immigrants, these proceedings vary
I Associate Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2014, St.
John's University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 2009, St. Lawrence University.
The author would like to thank Professor Anita S. Krishnakumar for her guidance in
writing this Note.
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from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and courts struggle with defining
"moral turpitude."' The result is uncertainty and unfairness for
an already marginalized population.2
America was founded as an immigrant nation, tolerant of
many ethnic and religious groups. For as long as the United
States has been admitting immigrants, it has been regulating
who is admissible. Commission of "crimes involving moral
turpitude," a term which appeared in immigration statutes as
early as 1891, has long been a factor that bars aliens3 from
admission and makes them deportable once admitted.4 The term
makes its most recent appearance in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 ("the INA").5 Common to all of these
immigration statutes is a lack of a definition for what constitutes
moral turpitude. This has led courts to adopt a wide range of
approaches for defining the term.6 As a result, the same factual
situation may lead to deportation in one jurisdiction, but it may
not lead to deportation in another jurisdiction.7
Prior to 2008, courts applied the moral turpitude provisions
of the INA in varying forms. Most courts applied some variation
of a two-step "categorical approach" that developed over several
decades of case law.' First, courts determined whether the
conviction was for a crime that categorically involves moral
turpitude in every instance, irrespective of the facts.9 Since it is
difficult to determine if a crime will always involve moral
turpitude, classifying it categorically often proved difficult. If the
initial categorical inquiry was inconclusive, and often it was,
courts then looked to a wide range of facts, depending on the
See infra Part II.A.
2 See infra Part I.C.3.
An "alien" is a person who is not a citizen, which is different than an
"immigrant," which is a person who immigrates to a country to reside there
permanently. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 84, 817 (9th ed. 2009). This Note uses both
terms because the usage depends on the status of the person. For example, an alien,
who is not a citizen, can be denied admission. An immigrant, who has lawfully
immigrated, can be deemed removable based on prior criminal convictions.
' See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084.
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West 2014).
6 See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part I.C.
9 See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th Cir. 2012).
[Vol. 88:147
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
jurisdiction.1" These variations were troubling for courts and
litigants, and they did not go unnoticed by legal scholars and the
Attorney General's office."
In response to the discrepancy in approaches to defining
crimes involving moral turpitude across the circuits, the Attorney
General issued an opinion aimed at creating a uniform approach
for handling these types of cases.' 2 His opinion settled the
division between the circuits by adopting the "realistic
probability" test while also adding a controversial third step that
allows the trial court to examine the underlying facts of a
conviction.13 However, relying on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,14 several circuits have refused to
adopt the Attorney General's approach on the ground that the
statute is unambiguous and therefore deference to the Attorney
General's opinion is unnecessary.' 5
This Note seeks to demonstrate that the term "moral
turpitude" is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant judicial deference
to the Attorney General's opinion in Silva-Trevino. Part I
explains the origins of "crimes involving moral turpitude" as
grounds for removal and inadmissibility, and how courts have
historically defined which crimes fit within this category. Even
though courts do not dispute the general definition of moral
turpitude, this Note explains how legislation that centers on
subjective issues like morality is inherently ambiguous. Part II
explains the shortfalls of the approach derived from case law
prior to Silva-Trevino, largely because of the variation observed
between courts, and details the Attorney General's solution
described in Silva-Trevino. It also details the inconsistencies
that resulted from not having a uniform approach. While some
10 See infra Part I.C.3. (describing the differences between the "minimal
conduct," "general nature," and "realistic probability" tests).
11 See, e.g., Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes
Involving Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 313-15
(2011); Brian C. Harms, Redefining "Crimes of Moral Turpitude" A Proposal to
Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 265 (2001).
12 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008).
18 See id. at 688-90.
14 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Chevron is the landmark Supreme Court case
that established the test for determining when a court must give deference to a
government agency's interpretation of a statute.
15 See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 481-82 (4th Cir. 2012); Fajardo v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011); Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen. of the
U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 473-74 (3d Cir. 2009).
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argue that the third step articulated in Silva-Trevino creates
substantial problems by granting courts too much discretion, this
Note aims to explain why the step is necessary and how it
resolves problems with the approach the opinion seeks to replace.
Part III details why the reviewing courts must find that the INA
is ambiguous and argue for deference to the test adopted in
Silva-Trevino. It also shows that the controversial third step
proves essential in only a limited number of cases, thereby
alleviating concerns that the approach opens the door to
relitigating the facts of these cases.
I. EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF "CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE" AND THE COURTS' APPROACHES
A. Historical Uses of the Term
It has long been the policy of the United States to exclude
aliens of certain classes. Early immigration statutes set the
stage for the limitations and wording of their modern successors.
As early as the Page Act of 1875 ("the Page Act"), aliens
convicted of felonies in their home countries were excluded from
immigrating to the United States. 16 The Page Act also prohibited
the importation of women for the purpose of prostitution 7 or
other "lewd and immoral purposes." The Page Act, however,
does not make aliens convicted of "political offenses"
inadmissible. 9 This exemption for political offenses remains in
current immigration statutes and the language is nearly
identical to that contained in the Page Act.20 While the Page Act
does not use the term "crimes involving moral turpitude," its
underlying policy was to exclude those who might erode the
morality of the nation.21
16 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477.
17 Id. § 3.
18 Id. § 1.
19 Id. § 5.
20 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(2)(A)(i)(I) (West 2014) (providing that aliens are
inadmissible if convicted of "a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely
political offense)").
21 See Ming M. Zhu, The Page Act of 1875: In the Name of Morality 4, 20-24
(Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1577213 (explaining that while the Page Act was an example of legislative
restraint by not passing harsher immigration laws, it was meant to protect
American morals and labor).
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The Immigration Act of 1891 ("the Immigration Act") greatly
expanded the class of aliens who were inadmissible. 22  It
contained one of the earliest references to moral turpitude in an
immigration statute.23 Notably absent from this statute was any
type of definition for what constitutes a crime or misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Act seemed to be
concerned with making those who would be an economic drain on
the country inadmissible.24 It also expanded from prior acts'
prohibitions against admitting those who have committed
felonies to exclude those who have committed
"crime[s] ... involving moral turpitude. 25 This language has
survived to present-day immigration statutes without any clear
definition from Congress as to what it precisely means.
B. Present Use of the Term in Immigration Statutes
While modern immigration policy is arguably much different
than its historical predecessors, there are presently many
reasons why aliens can be deemed inadmissible or deportable.
Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the
INA") of 1952 to revise and unify the immigration laws of the
country.26  In its present form, aliens are inadmissible or
deportable for a variety of reasons, including health concerns,
criminal convictions, drug trafficking, prostitution, marriage
fraud, and unlawful voting. While the statute lists several
specific crimes or circumstances that make an immigrant
removable or inadmissible, it also includes what some would
consider a catch-all provision for crimes involving moral
turpitude.28
22 See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084 (providing that the
following persons were inadmissible: "All idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons
likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous
contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, [and] polygamists").
23 Id.
24 See id. § 3.
25 Id. § 1.
26 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(also known as the McCarren-Walter Act).
27 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West 2014); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).
28 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182; 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
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The phrase "crimes involving moral turpitude" appears in
two sections titled "Inadmissible aliens" and "Deportable
aliens."2 9 The statute provides that "any alien convicted of, or
who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts
which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving
moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an
attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime... is
inadmissible."" The statute also provides that "[a]ny alien who
is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude... is
deportable. 31  Consistent with previous immigration statutes,
there is no definition for what constitutes a crime involving
moral turpitude.2
C. Courts'Approaches Towards Defining "Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude"
Absent a clear procedure for determining which crimes
constitute moral turpitude, courts have been left to craft a test
case-by-case. The result is a test that varies across states and
circuits and leads to an inconsistent application of immigration
law. The Supreme Court has only addressed the issue once,
leaving many questions unanswered.
1. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of "Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude"
The Supreme Court last granted certiorari in a case
concerning a crime involving moral turpitude in 1951 in Jordan
v. De George.31 Several important pieces of law came out of that
decision. The defendant in Jordan had been convicted twice of
defrauding the United States of its tax on liquor and the Court
was tasked with deciding whether his convictions were crimes
29 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182; 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
so 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
31 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (providing that "[a]ny alien who is convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years (or 10 years in the case of an
alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 1255(j) of this title)
after the date of admission, and is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one
year or longer may be imposed, is deportable."); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)
("Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions
were in a single trial, is deportable.").
32 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
33 341 U.S. 223, 223-25 (1951).
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involving moral turpitude that made him eligible for removal.34
The Court, persuaded by holdings from federal and state courts,
held that fraud is categorically a crime involving moral
turpitude. 5 The Court narrowed its holding by saying that not
all fraud involves moral turpitude, but fraud is often an essential
element that evinces moral turpitude.
In deciding the case, the Court took no issue with the
definition that the circuit courts were using in their decisions
and the definition remains unchanged to this day.37 The circuits
have held that the term "crimes involving moral turpitude"
applies only to "crimes of violence, or crimes which are commonly
thought of as involving baseness, vileness or depravity" and
behavior that is "contrary to the accepted rules of morality and
the duties owed between persons or to society in general."38 This
"definition" is open-ended and unsettling because of its
vagueness and subjective nature, but the Supreme Court did not
address these shortcomings and only decided the narrower issue
of whether conspiracy to defraud the government of liquor taxes
involves moral turpitude. 9
This decision is an early indicator of the difficulty courts face
when applying the moral turpitude provisions of immigration
statutes. Justice Jackson noted in his dissent the inherent
problems with ruling on crimes that punish morality.4" He noted
34 Id. ("This case presents only one question: whether conspiracy to defraud the
United States of taxes on distilled spirits is a 'crime involving moral
turpitude'. ...").
31 Id. at 229.
36 Id.
11 See id. at 226.
31 Id. at 226; Hernandez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir. 2009); see,
e.g., Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2009); Knapik v.
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004).
39 See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 223-24, 232 ("Whatever else the phrase 'crime
involving moral turpitude' may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it
plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as
involving moral turpitude.").
40 Id. at 239-42 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson commented that:
The use of the phrase by state courts for various civil proceedings affords
no teaching for federal courts. The Federal Government has no common-
law crimes and the judges are not permitted to define crimes by decision,
for they rest solely in statute. Nor are we persuaded that the state courts
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that Congress had not given a clear definition of what behavior
constitutes deportable conduct and that it is not the judiciary's
job to make that determination. 41 He went on to say:
We should not forget that criminality is one thing-a matter of
law-and that morality, ethics and religious teachings are
another. Their relations have puzzled the best of men.
Assassination, for example, whose criminality no one doubts,
has been the subject of serious debate as to its morality. This
does not make crime less criminal, but it shows on what
treacherous grounds we tread when we undertake to translate
ethical concepts into legal ones, case by case. We usually end
up by condemning all that we personally disapprove and for no
better reason than that we disapprove it. In fact, what better
reason is there? Uniformity and equal protection of the law can
come only from a statutory definition of fairly stable and
confined bounds.42
Though these difficulties were apparent early on, they remained
unresolved for several decades.
The Court also rejected the "void for vagueness" argument
advanced by the defendant.43 To pass constitutional muster, a
criminal statute must be specific enough to warn members of
society of the consequences of their actions.44 In this case,
however, since the immigration statute is not a criminal statute
and there were no other cases finding it to be vague, the Court
found there to be adequate warning so as to uphold the statute as
constitutional.45 This argument is difficult to understand given
the possible breadth of crimes that could be considered base, vile,
or depraved.46
41 Id. at 242 ("Apparently, Congress expected the courts to determine the
various crimes includable in this vague phrase. We think that not a judicial
function.").
42 Id. at 241-42.
43 Id. at 231-32 (majority opinion).
'4 See id. at 230.
41 Id. at 230-32.
46 See Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for
Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 701 (2012) (analogizing the role of judges in
determining what constitutes morality to the "role of God" in judging sins). The
article also emphasizes that the Board of Immigration Appeals often hears cases of
first impression and it is difficult to "translate ethical concepts into legal ones, case
by case." Id. at 683 (quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting)). See
generally 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL: VISAS § 4 0.21(a) notes,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86942.pdf (describing a
[Vol. 88:147
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2. The Emergence of Step One: The Categorical Approach
Following what seemed to be the Supreme Court's lead,47
most courts have settled on a preliminary inquiry into whether
the underlying conviction is categorically a crime involving moral
turpitude.48 This categorical approach requires the court to look
at the statutory elements of the crime, instead of the underlying
facts, to determine whether the crime in every possible factual
situation is a crime involving moral turpitude.49 Since the
statute is defined in terms of "baseness, vileness, or depravity," 0
this type of inquiry involves some level of subjectivity because it
requires the judge to make some judgment as to what is base,
vile, or depraved. These judgments are likely to vary across the
country and, in fact, have varied across jurisdictions.51 When
viewed in terms of extremes, most judges could easily determine
whether a crime fits the category.52 But unfortunately, those
cases that are not at the extremes represent the biggest problems
for courts and defendants.
This categorical approach was borrowed from a line of
sentencing enhancement cases interpreting the Armed Career
Criminal Act ("ACCA") in which courts faced an ambiguity
similar to that in the INA.53 In Taylor v. United States, the
defendant faced sentencing enhancement for a burglary
conviction, but the term "burglary" had no single definition.
5 4
The Court interpreted the sentencing enhancement statute to
range of offenses, from assault to mail fraud, which may constitute moral turpitude
for the purpose of issuing visas).
" See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232.
48 See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 484 (4th Cir. 2012).
49 Id.
50 Jordan, 341 U.S. at 226.
51 See infra Part II.A. (discussing how different circuits reach different results
when analyzing arguably similar facts).
52 Hypothetically, rape would very likely be considered a crime involving moral
turpitude because of the nature of the crime, whereas assault would most likely not
be a crime involving moral turpitude. It is those crimes in the middle that prove the
most difficult for courts.
- See Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 484 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
600-01 (1990)).
14 495 U.S. at 580 (explaining that state courts define burglary differently and it
is not clear whether, in the sentencing enhancement context, Congress intended that
courts apply the common-law definition, a generic definition articulated under the
Model Penal Code, or some other form). Burglary at common law had to be
committed at nighttime and in a dwelling, but it would not make sense to take such
a narrow reading today. See id. at 582.
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mean that Congress intended the courts to "look only to the fact
that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within
certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior
convictions."" The Court reaffirmed this narrow inquiry fifteen
years later in another sentencing enhancement case, Shepard v.
United States."
Courts applying the moral turpitude provisions have widely
adopted the categorical approach outlined under the ACCA, but
this leaves something to be desired for the middle-of-the-road
cases where the conviction is not easily defined as categorically
involving moral turpitude. Burglary and other predicate offenses
under the enhanced sentencing laws are easier to define than
moral turpitude because they have concrete elements.57 As much
as the categorical approach tells courts how to define moral
turpitude, it does not remove the subjective nature of the inquiry.
This initial subjective inquiry, borrowed from Supreme Court
precedent, has led to fundamental unfairness for immigrants and
does not help the courts procedurally to determine which crimes
involve moral turpitude.
The categorical approach borrowed from ACCA cases is ill-
suited for dealing with crimes involving moral turpitude. With
burglary, for example, a court must determine whether the
elements of a burglary (which may vary, but are generally well-
defined) satisfy the elements of the ACCA.58 Categorically
defining crimes with established elements is simple in most
cases.5 9 If a court seeks to determine whether burglary is a crime
involving moral turpitude, however, it must determine if the
crime and its elements are inherently "base, vile, or depraved"
11 Id. at 600 (finding the Court of Appeals' use of a categorical approach
persuasive).
"6 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 23 (2005) (explaining that in the
15 years since Taylor, Congress has not modified the judicial understanding that
only a "restricted look beyond the record of conviction" is permissible).
57 Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.20 (McKinney 2014) (listing the
elements of burglary in the third degree as "knowingly enter[ing] or remain[ing]
unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein"), with
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012) (providing for the deportation of any alien
"convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude").
58 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 579 (explaining that to qualify for sentencing
enhancement, the burglary must be classified as a violent felony).
," For example, if a defendant was previously convicted of three crimes carrying
a sentence of more than one year, he would qualify for sentencing enhancement
regardless of the crimes or their elements. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
(Vol. 88:147
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since the moral turpitude provisions have no elements. 0
Categorizing crimes according to morality is rarely simple.
Perhaps a better analogy would be the courts' handling of the
moral turpitude provisions in attorney misconduct rules, which is
discussed below.61
3. Step Two: The Modified Categorical Approach and Its
Variants
Quite predictably, many courts find the question of what
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude unresolved after
completion of the categorical inquiry.62 Since the elements of
many crimes do not make it clear whether they involve moral
turpitude, courts often proceed to subsequent steps of analysis.
Without further interpretation from the Supreme Court or
Congress, the circuit courts were left to create their own
additional steps of inquiry.
In general, courts adopted a "modified categorical approach"
as a second step, which looked at limited facts to determine if a
crime was one involving moral turpitude.6 This approach allows
the court to examine the record of conviction, which is composed
of the charging document, the plea agreement, any plea colloquy,
and any explicit facts found by the trial judge. 64 This second step
gives courts significantly more information to consider when
making their determination. Since this step developed in the
courts rather than through legislation, courts have applied it in
varying forms.
60 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008) (explaining
that "moral turpitude is not an element of an offense").
61 See infra Part III.
62 See, e.g., Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying the
modified-categorical approach after the categorical approach failed to resolve
whether third degree burglary under Connecticut law was a crime involving moral
turpitude); Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006)
(applying the modified-categorical approach after the categorical approach did not
resolve whether battery was a crime involving moral turpitude).
6 See Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 485 (4th Cir. 2012); Wala, 511 F.3d at
109.
1 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). The Court explained:
[The] enquiry under the ACCA ... is limited to the terms of the charging
document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between
judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed
by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.
2014]
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The Third and Fifth Circuits have focused their analysis on
whether even the most "minimal conduct" under the statute
could be considered a crime involving moral turpitude. 65 Courts
using this analysis hold that a crime involves moral turpitude if
the most basic reading of the statute reaches only those offenses
necessarily involving moral turpitude.66 If the statute might
include crimes that are not inherently morally turpitudinous,
then the crime is not considered to categorically involve moral
turpitude. This approach also makes a distinction over whether
the statute is divisible, or can be divided into subsections that do
or do not constitute crimes involving moral turpitude.68 Where
the statute is divisible, the court looks to the record of conviction
to determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude.69
In contrast, the First and Eighth Circuits developed a
separate approach at step two. These courts look to the statute
to determine if its "general nature" or "common usage" evidences
that the crime involves moral turpitude.70 This approach relieves
the court of the burden of reviewing underlying facts.71 It leaves
the judge to consider any hypothetical situation in which the
statute could include a crime that is not morally turpitudinous
when making the decision 2.7  This broad interpretation of the
65 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693-94 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008) (citing
Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006)); Partyka v. Att'y Gen. of
the U.S., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3rd Cir. 2005).
66 Amouzadeh, 467 F.3d at 455. The use of the word "minimum" is confusing,




70 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (citing Marciano v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971)); Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d
237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S.
901 (1955).
71 Pino, 215 F.2d at 245. The court explained:
If the crime in its general nature is one which in common usage would be
classified as a crime involving moral turpitude, neither the administrative
officials in a deportation proceeding nor the courts on review of
administrative action are under the oppressive burden of taking and
considering evidence of the circumstances of a particular offense so as to
determine whether there were extenuating factors which might relieve the
offender of the stigma of moral obliquity.
Id.
72 See, e.g., Franklin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 72 F.3d 571, 581
n.8 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the "general nature" test is adopted in most
majority opinions, though there are some dissents); Cabral v. Immigration &
[Vol. 88:147
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statute seems to recognize the problem in defining crimes
involving moral turpitude without really adding anything to the
analysis because it would find that most crimes do not fit within
the category.
Adding to the confusion, the Ninth Circuit has developed yet
another version of step two. The Ninth Circuit evaluated
whether moral turpitude is inherent in all cases that have a
"realistic probability" of being prosecuted.73  This is a
modification of the "minimum conduct" test with the qualifier
that prosecution be realistically possible. If an alien can show
that the statute of conviction could realistically apply to conduct
that is not morally turpitudinous, then the conviction is not
treated as being categorically a crime involving moral
turpitude.74 This test is borrowed from a review of a removal
proceeding not involving the moral turpitude provision where the
Court determined whether the term "theft offense" included
"aiding and abetting" a theft offense. 75 The Court held that there
must be a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that
the State would apply its statute to conduct falling outside the
generic definition" of a crime.76 This approach requires judges to
look at other similar cases rather than formulate hypothetical
situations of how the statute might apply, as is done in the
"general usage" test.77
Naturalization Serv., 15 F.3d 193, 197 n.6 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that the
definition rests on administrative workability).
73 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694 (citing Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523
F.3d 992, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled en banc by Marmolejo-Campos v.
Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009)).
14 See Nicanor-Romero, 523 F.3d at 1005. Defendant was charged with annoying
or molesting a child under eighteen under California law. Id. at 995. The court held
that since another court had found that a conviction with similar facts under the
same law could constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, there was a realistic
probability of prosecution. Id. at 1007 (citing People v. Villareal, No. B161735, 2003
WL 21153430, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 20, 2003) (explaining how a man's
inappropriate sexual comments to a thirteen-year-old and then following her down
the street could support a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude).
" Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 185 (2007). Defendant aided and
abetted the taking of a vehicle, which the Court classified as a general theft offense
for the purpose of removal. See id. at 187-89.
76 Id. at 193.
71 Id. at 190-92 (explaining that to make such a showing, an offender must at
least point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts did apply the
statute in the special nongeneric manner for which the offender argues).
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II. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
SOLUTION
Immigration is a contentious issue-it is always a key factor
in elections and a frequent subject of Supreme Court attention.18
Recent immigration policy developments have shown an
increasingly anti-immigrant sentiment.79  The number of
immigrants facing removal has more than doubled in the decade
following September 11, 2001.80 While this trend may be policy-
based, the judiciary's varied approaches to immigration issues,
including what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, is
a contributing factor.81
A. Same Law, Different Results
While a general framework has emerged to guide courts in
defining what constitutes crimes involving moral turpitude, 2
there are many instances where two different courts or
administrative bodies, analyzing similar facts, have reached
opposite conclusions. Alexander Hamilton recognized early in
78 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507-09 (2012) (upholding
Arizona's controversial "show your papers" law); Nate Silver, What Obama's
Immigration Decision Might Mean for 2012, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012, 7:55 AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/what-obamas-immigration-
decision-might-mean-for-2012/ (commenting on the role Hispanics will play in the
2012 presidential election).
71 See Strengthening Interior Enforcement: Deportation and Related Issues:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec. & Citizenship, & on
Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
60-61 (2005) (statement of Victor X. Cerda, Acting Director of Detention and
Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department of
Homeland Security), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/
20050414testimony.pdf ("The role that [Detention and Removal Operations] plays is
recognized throughout our strategic plan, 'Endgame,' which seeks to reach a point
where for every order of removal issued, a removal is effectuated.").
80 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 tbl.39 (2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2011-3 (showing that in 2001,
the total number of removals was 189,026, and in 2011, the total number of
removals was 391,953).
81 See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse Univ., Individuals
Charged with Moral Turpitude in Immigration Court, TRACIMMIGRATION (2008),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/moral-turp.html (showing a steady increase
in the number of individuals charged with crimes involving moral turpitude in
immigration court).
82 See supra Part I.C.
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our nation's history the importance of a uniform immigration
law. 3 He wrote in the Federalist Papers that power over
naturalization "must necessarily be exclusive; because if each
State had power to prescribe a distinct rule, there could not be a
uniform rule."8 4 The judiciary, however, has not been able to
deliver a uniform approach in dealing with crimes involving
moral turpitude.
There is confusion among the circuit courts about how to
handle arguably similar offenses. The Eighth Circuit has held
that child endangerment is a crime involving moral turpitude
because of the disregard of the substantial risk to the child,
which is contrary to the moral duties owed by everyone to
society. 5 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that attempted
misdemeanor child abandonment, which is statutorily defined in
Texas as "expos[ing] the child to an unreasonable risk of harm,"
is not a crime involving moral turpitude because "it does not
shock the public conscience as being inherently base,
vile,... depraved," or morally reprehensible.86 These cases deal
with the same issue, exposing a child to risk, and yet each court
uses a different lens of analysis and reaches a different
conclusion. 7
The Board of Immigration Appeals ("the BIA") also seems to
reach conflicting conclusions on arguably similar crimes even
before these immigration cases reach the circuit courts for
review. 8 The BIA has held that resisting arrest under Texas law
83 See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penn State
Electronic Classics Series Publication 2001), available at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/
faculty/jmanis/poldocs/fed-papers.pdf.
84 Id.
85 See Hernandez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 2009). The
defendant in this case was also convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated,
which the court held was categorically not a crime involving moral turpitude. The
court considered the child endangerment conviction as a sort of aggravating factor in
terms of the removal proceedings. Id.
86 Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2005); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.041(b) (West 2007).
87 Compare Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
providing false identification to a police officer is not categorically a crime involving
moral turpitude), with Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that providing false identification to a police officer is categorically a crime
involving moral turpitude).
88 The BIA is an administrative body with nationwide jurisdiction to review
appeals from immigration judges. See Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, JUSTICE.GOV (Nov. 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm.
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is not a crime involving moral turpitude.8 9 In In re Garcia-Lopez,
the defendant intentionally resisted arrest, but he did not
intentionally attempt to cause the arresting officer bodily
injury.9" The record of conviction only showed a guilty plea for
resisting arrest.91  In contrast, the BIA has also held that
resisting arrest under Utah law is a crime involving moral
turpitude.92 Even though the underlying act is the same, the BIA
reached two different conclusions.
The approaches some courts have taken at step two of the
inquiry do not adequately enforce the INA. The "minimum
conduct" test in the Third and Fifth Circuits are likely under-
inclusive. Reading the statute narrowly excludes some cases
that would otherwise be considered crimes involving moral
turpitude. In contrast, the "general usage" test is likely over
inclusive. A broad reading of the statute includes crimes that
might otherwise not be considered to involve moral turpitude. It
" See In re Garcia-Lopez, No. A38 096 900, 2007 WL 4699842, at *1-2 (B.I.A.
Nov. 2, 2007) (unpublished decision) (explaining that, absent intent to cause bodily
injury, the crime is not one involving moral turpitude); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 38.03 (West 1994). The Texas statute provides that:
A person commits an offense if he intentionally prevents or obstructs a
person he knows is a peace officer or a person acting in a peace officer's
presence and at his direction from effecting an arrest, search, or
transportation of the actor or another by using force against the peace
officer or another.
Id. § 38.03(a).
90 See Garcia-Lopez, 2007 WL 4699842, at *2.
91 See id. at *1.
92 See Vaquero-Cordero v. Holder, 498 F. App'x 760, 766 (10th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the BIA's determination that resisting arrest is a crime involving
moral turpitude was improper). The defendant in this case merely held the door
closed to prevent his capture while the police officer attempted entry. See id. While
the convictions are under two different states' obstruction of justice statutes, there
are no remarkable differences between them. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
38.03(a) (West 1994), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-306(1)(b) (West 2009). The Utah
statute provides that:
An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder,
delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction,
or punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal
offense... prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from
performing any act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person.
§ 76-8-306(1)(b). The court, comparing the facts of Vaquero-Cordero to Garcia-Lopez,
found no real distinction to rationalize the conflicting results. See Vaquero-Cordero,
498 F. App'x at 765.
9' See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693-95 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008).
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is unlikely that Congress intended the statute to be enforced
from either of these two extremes and a more moderate,
consistent approach is appropriate.
B. Implications for Immigrant Defendants
The range of judicial and administrative decisions on what
qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude demonstrates the
institutional unfairness that immigrants face in these types of
proceedings.94 Quite simply, an immigrant convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude in one jurisdiction may face
deportation while an immigrant convicted of the same crime in
another jurisdiction may not. Immigration law should be
uniform throughout the country as a matter of fairness. The
Constitution provides for procedural fairness in all proceedings, 95
and it is lacking in the immigration context under the system in
place prior to Silva-Trevino.
Depending on the method of analysis, nearly any crime could
be considered to contain some element that evinces moral
turpitude because all crime is viewed as bad for society. The
United States Department of State has published a twenty-six
page manual to guide its officers on what crimes constitute moral
turpitude.96 The manual makes a general statement that the
most common elements of crimes that involve moral turpitude
include "(1) [flraud; (2) [1]arceny; and (3) [ilntent to harm persons
or things."97 This is a broad description that demonstrates just
how inclusive the INA can be interpreted without a uniform
procedure in place for judicial review.
An immigrant has the right under U.S. law to be represented
in removal proceedings,98 but access to legal services is difficult
or impossible for many immigrants.99 This is because of some
94 See supra Part II.A.
9" See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
96 See 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 46.
91 Id. § 40.21(a) N2.2.
98 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012).
99 See, e.g., NAT'L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR., ISOLATED IN DETENTION: LIMITED
ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES JEOPARDIZES A
FAIR DAY IN COURT 3 (2010), available at https://www.immigrantjustice.org/
isolatedindetention. While the U.S. government detains nearly 400,000 immigrants
yearly, there are only approximately 100 non-government organizations providing
legal assistance to detained immigrants and most have fewer than five staff
members working on detention cases. Id.
2014]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
immigrants' inability to pay for representation and the lack of
lawyers available. It is not uncommon for immigrants to appear
unrepresented and without a full understanding of the
proceedings. 00 Most immigrants, and in fact probably some
attorneys, do not understand the importance of contesting the
moral turpitude designation at trial. While a uniform system for
classifying crimes involving moral turpitude will not address
access to justice issues for immigrants, it is important to
recognize the disadvantage that this population experiences in
court already. A uniform approach would, at a minimum, ensure
that immigrants, represented and unrepresented alike, receive
the same treatment under the law.
C. The Attorney General's Approach
Recognizing the BIA and federal courts' struggles in
applying the moral turpitude section of the INA, the Attorney
General issued an opinion in the 2008 decision In the matter of
Silva-Trevino to "establish a uniform framework for ensuring
that the Act's moral turpitude provisions are fairly and
accurately applied." 01 Silva-Trevino did not revolutionize the
approach used by the courts and the BIA. Instead, it articulated
three steps, the first and second of which were largely adopted
from developments in case law, and a novel third step for
determining which crimes are crimes involving moral
turpitude. 102
In determining if a crime involves moral turpitude, courts
should first engage in a "categorical" inquiry, looking at the
statute of conviction and not the specific facts of the case, to
determine if every possible conviction under the statute could
involve moral turpitude.' 3 Although most, if not all, courts
already performed this inquiry, the Attorney General refined this
step by saying that the proper approach is to determine if there
is a "realistic probability" that the statute of conviction would
reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. 104 This
settles a division among the circuits by adopting the language
100 See id. at 2.
101 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008).
102 Id. at 688-90.
103 Id. at 688.
104 Id. at 689-90.
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and approach of the Ninth Circuit.105 If the first step does not
resolve the issue, courts should then proceed to a "modified
categorical" inquiry, examining the record of conviction, which
includes "the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury
instructions, a signed guilty plea and the plea transcript."1 6
Some courts had also previously applied this step in their
analyses, 10 7 but the Attorney General's opinion clarifies exactly
what evidence courts should consider. If the question is still
unanswered, courts should "to the extent they deem it necessary
and appropriate, consider evidence beyond the formal record of
conviction."0 8
Since the first two steps of the Attorney General's approach
have their roots in case law, they have been met with little
resistance in subsequent decisions. The third step, however, is a
novel addition and has received considerable pushback from
several circuit courts.'0 9 It leaves substantial discretion to the
trial judge to look at the underlying facts,"0 which could present
more problems than solutions on the issue of uniform application
of the law. But as Part III discusses, analyzing crimes involving
moral turpitude requires such a fact-based approach.
D. Criticism from Circuit Courts That Refuse To Follow Silva-
Trevino
The most common argument advanced by circuit courts that
do not follow the approach outlined in Silva-Trevino is that the
INA is not ambiguous in identifying a procedure for analyzing
crimes involving moral turpitude.' Absent any ambiguity, there
is no need, and in fact, no authority, for an agency to interpret
the statute.1 2 The Fourth Circuit argued that since the statute
makes aliens "convicted" of a crime involving moral turpitude
inadmissible, the focus is on conviction and there is no
ambiguity.1 3  The court further argued that the Attorney
105 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
106 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690.
10' See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
108 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690.
109 See infra Part II.D.
110 See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690.
11I See, e.g., Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 476 (4th Cir. 2012).
112 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
118 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (West 2014); Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 482.
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General was misguided in finding that the word "involving"
within the phrase "crimes involving moral turpitude" created
ambiguity and invited a fact-based inquiry."4 Those courts that
find no ambiguity have continued to apply the approach from
Taylor and Shepard, which does not examine underlying facts.115
Another argument advanced by these courts is that Congress
has acquiesced to judicial interpretation because it has not
updated the statute through amendments." 6 The INA has been
amended approximately sixty-six times since its original
enactment in 1952.1" The courts reason that the case law of the
last several decades has settled the issue and therefore their
precedent dictates that there is no ambiguity.1  There is,
however, overwhelming evidence that precedent is not settled.11 9
It is precisely this unsettled precedent that led the Attorney
General to issue his opinion in Silva-Trevino.
III. SILVA-TREVINO AS A UNIFORM APPROACH TO AN AMBIGUOUS
STATUTE
The Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits argue that the INA
is not ambiguous, but this argument goes against Supreme Court
precedent regarding statutory interpretation.12 This Part of the
Note argues that the only logical interpretation courts can have
is that the statute is ambiguous. And, if that is the case, the
Attorney General's opinion must be accorded deference.
A. Why Circuit Courts Must Find Ambiguity in the INA Statute
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided the landmark Chevron
case on the proper scope of judicial deference to agency
interpretation of statutes. 2 ' In Chevron, the court outlined a
114 Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 481-82.
11 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
116 Fajardo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Congress is
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation... when it re-
enacts a statute without change." (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580
(1978))).
117 See generally 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182.
11 See Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1307-09 (detailing courts of appeals' decisions from
1914 to present that apply a categorical approach in determining whether a
conviction involves moral turpitude).
119 See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.




CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
two-step process for reviewing an agency's construction of a
statute.122 A court must first determine whether Congress has
spoken directly on the issue at hand and, if it has, then
Congress's intent must be given full effect. 123 If Congress has not
spoken on the issue, the question becomes whether the agency's
determination is a permissible construction of the statute. 24
This framework recognizes that administrative agencies are in a
better position than the judiciary to make decisions about policy.
All courts interpreting the moral turpitude statute have analyzed
whether deference was appropriate under Chevron,25 but not all
have reached the conclusion that the statute is ambiguous.126
Pursuant to the first step under Chevron, Congress has not
spoken directly on the definition of crimes involving moral
turpitude. The INA includes a "definitions" section, but it does
not define crimes involving moral turpitude. 127 While the lack of
a definition itself does not make a statute ambiguous, it does
create the potential for the definition to be crafted by judicial or
agency interpretation. The courts and the Attorney General
seem to take no issue with the definition arising from case law,
but the adopted definition is ambiguous.1
21
Courts have applied the canon of construction requiring that
words of a statute be given their plain meaning.1 29 There is no
plain meaning for the term "moral turpitude." Dictionaries
define the term with vague and subjective terms. Black's Law
Dictionary defines "moral turpitude" as "[cionduct that is
contrary to justice, honesty, or morality."1 30 The Oxford English
Dictionary defines "moral" as that which is "concerned with the
principles of right and wrong behaviour" and the goodness or
badness of human character, and "turpitude" as coming from the
122 Id. at 842-43.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 843.
125 See id. at 842-43.
126 See, e.g., Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 2012).
127 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
128 See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
129 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary
that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language
in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the
constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.").
130 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1101 (9th ed. 2009).
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Latin turpitudo meaning "depraved or wicked.'' What is
"depraved" or "wicked" is a judgment call that each person, and
each judge, makes depending on personal point of view. 132 The
very nature of these terms invites a fact-based inquiry such as
the one that the Attorney General has proposed. Interpreting
this statutory term requires an analysis of what is right and
wrong, and the answer often lies beyond the language of the
conviction statute.
Congress expressly delegated the power of interpretation to
the Attorney General.133  The INA says "determination[s] and
ruling[s] by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of
law shall be controlling."1 34 This express delegation precludes the
judiciary from interpreting the statute. It is also consistent with
the idea that it is not the judiciary's role to determine policy and
that those decisions are better left to the executive branch, which
is accountable to the populace. 35
Courts that find the statute to be unambiguous rely on the
language that refers to "convictions" to support their
argument. 36  These courts argue that since the statute deals
with convictions, the proper inquiry is to look at the statute of
conviction and nothing further. 13 This only addresses half of the
argument, however. While this reference to convictions directs
the courts to consider the grounds for conviction of the
underlying crime, it does not answer the question of which facts
courts should consider. Courts that reject the Attorney General's
approach fear a relitigation of the facts of the underlying
"' OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2004).
132 Justice Jackson rightly pointed out this problem in his dissent in Jordan,
which upheld a conviction for moral turpitude. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S.
223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("If we go to the dictionaries, the last resort
of the baffled judge, we learn little except that the expression is redundant, for
turpitude alone means moral wickedness or depravity and moral turpitude seems to
mean little more than morally immoral.").
133 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012).
134 Id.
131 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984) ("The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial
ones ....").
136 See, e.g., Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012).
131 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-01 (1990); Prudencio, 669
F.3d at 484; Yousefi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 260 F.3d 318, 326 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
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138crime, but the Attorney General specifically addressed this
issue in Silva-Trevino by saying that the approach is not an
invitation to relitigate the facts.139 It seems possible that courts
could consider the factual circumstances of the underlying
conviction that qualified the crime as a crime involving moral
turpitude without relitigating them since this type of inquiry is
regularly conducted in appellate courts.1
40
Perhaps just as important is that Congress has not
precluded a factual inquiry. There is nothing in the legislative
history or amendments that would suggest that a factual inquiry
would be inappropriate. The Attorney General's opinion is not
inconsistent with congressional intent since there is no
preclusion of his third step and therefore, it should be given
deference according to Chevron.
B. Comparing the Use of "Moral Turpitude" in Attorney
Disciplinary Proceedings
The term "moral turpitude" is used, but not defined, in other
areas of the law, which provides further support that the term is
ambiguous. The term's use in the context of attorney discipline
serves as a useful basis for comparison. The term appears in the
comments to rule 8.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which regulates attorney misconduct."' This rule recognizes
that certain illegal conduct adversely affects an attorney's ability
to practice law.14 ' This is similar to the recognition in the
immigration statutes that certain conduct will affect an
immigrant's ability to remain in the country. The comment says
that when assessing what behavior constitutes misconduct,
"[t]raditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses
involving 'moral turpitude[,]'. . . [a] concept [that] can be
construed to include offenses concerning some matters of
personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses." 43
138 Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483-84.
139 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 690 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008) ("[I]t is not an
occasion to relitigate facts or determinations made in the earlier criminal
proceeding.").
140 See, e.g., Jarbough v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 483 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2007)
("[lit is clear that courts of appeals continue to have no jurisdiction to review
discretionary and factual determinations presented in petitions for review.").
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Using morality as indicia of acceptable behavior, in the context of
professional conduct or immigration law, is problematic in both
definition and application.
There are several important things to note from comparing
the use of the term "moral turpitude" in the attorney discipline
context to the immigration context. First, courts reach
conflicting decisions when faced with similar facts just as they do
in immigration proceedings.144 Second, unlike in the immigration
context, in the attorney discipline context, courts reviewing
disciplinary determinations look to the underlying facts when
making their decisions. 145 Third, an examination of the case law
seems to suggest that it is relatively difficult for an attorney to be
found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.14 6
Similar to immigration cases, courts reviewing professional
misconduct have struggled to define moral turpitude. 141 Some
courts adopt a definition of base and vile behavior, which is
similar to the definition in the immigration context, but other
courts note that "[t]he concept of moral turpitude depends upon
the state of public morals, and may vary according to the
community or the times."1 41 hile some courts reviewing
disciplinary proceedings have recognized the subjective nature of
moral turpitude, circuit courts reviewing immigration decisions
seem to ignore this reality.
Many would argue that attorneys should be held to a higher
standard because of their superior knowledge and role in society.
Perhaps immigrants, because of their status as non-citizens,
should also be held to a higher standard. That seems like an
acceptable argument, but if that is the case, then the standards
should be clear in both the definition of moral turpitude and how
courts identify the illegal conduct that leads to deportation and
144 Compare In re Higgins, 105 A.D.2d 462, 462, 480 N.Y.S.2d 257, 257-58 (3d
Dep't 1984) (holding that possession of marijuana is not a crime involving moral
turpitude), with State v. Denton, 598 P.2d 663, 665 (Okla. 1979) (holding that
possession of marijuana is a crime involving moral turpitude).
145 See, e.g., Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Proctor, 524 A.2d 773, 774-75
(Md. 1987) (recanting the facts of an arrest for possession of marijuana).
14' See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 254 Cal. Rptr. 15, 18, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that even felony assault is not a crime involving moral turpitude).
147 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
'4 Jay Wilson, Comment, The Definitional Problems with "Moral Turpitude," 16
J. LEGAL PROF. 261, 261 (1991) (citing In re Fahey, 505 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Cal. 1973)).
[Vol. 88:147
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
inadmissibility. This clarity is something the Attorney General
attempted to adopt in Silva-Trevino and it is what is missing in
the Shepard and Taylor decisions.
C. How Silva-Trevino Solves the Problem, and Suggestions
Going Forward
While courts have been hesitant to adopt the approach
outlined in Silva-Trevino, this approach is a marked
improvement from where the judicial interpretation of the INA
was before the decision. Whether the approach is correct or not,
there is now a uniform framework for analyzing crimes involving
moral turpitude.149 This promotes fairness and lessens the
burden on defense attorneys, who can now argue for a clear,
single standard regardless of the jurisdiction. Procedurally,
Silva-Trevino addresses many issues that courts could not settle
over the previous sixty or so years.
The approach allows for an inquiry into the underlying facts
since in many cases looking to the statute of conviction will not
answer the question of whether the crime is necessarily one
involving moral turpitude.15 ° Because no statute includes moral
turpitude as an element of the crime, many courts find an
examination of some of the underlying facts to be useful.
Whereas a range of different categorical inquiries prior to Silva-
Trevino created substantial unfairness,5 some argue that a
range of different factual inquiries under the third step could
cause similar problems.
Courts' apprehensions about the ability to examine any facts
"to the extent they deem ... necessary and appropriate" is
understandable.5 2 This broad discretion could create entirely
new sets of problems. This criticism, however, is overstated. It
is important to note that the discretion of the trial judge to look
at any facts he or she deems necessary is a last resort. The
general feeling is that the majority of inquiries will be answered
in the analysis of the first two steps.5 3 Since the focus of courts
149 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
150 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
'5' See supra Part I.C.
152 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
151 See Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 479 (3d Cir. 2009)
(noting that in the last one hundred years "adjudicators have applied the categorical
approach to the CIMT inquiry without great difficulty").
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applying the INA is determining what constitutes amoral
behavior, the underlying facts are essential to answering such a
subjective inquiry and they cannot be ignored. If the legislature
is intent on regulating immigration with a subjective concept like
morality, courts must be given the power to examine facts.
Examining facts will enable the trier of fact to fully understand a
conviction that creates just a brief window into an immigrant's
morality. Even with access to facts, questions of morality are
still highly subjective.
Enumerating the facts that courts should look at would be
one way to reign in the discretion and prevent abuse at the trial
court level. The Attorney General enumerated which facts
should be considered at step two of the inquiry, but left step
three to the judge's discretion."' It is difficult to identify abuses
of this third step thus far since many courts have explicitly
rejected the Attorney General's approach. 15 Given the difficulty
of determining what constitutes a crime involving moral
turpitude, this granting of discretion to the courts by the
Attorney General is likely on purpose and should be given
deference. The Attorney General determined that more facts are
necessary in difficult cases that cannot be decided at step one or
step two. Limiting the factual inquiry will leave the court with
insufficient information to determine whether the crime
committed involved moral turpitude.
Silva-Trevino provides a clear demonstration of where the
third step of the approach proves useful. On appeal, the BIA
determined that a Texas statute for indecency with a child was
not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it
could include conduct that is not morally turpitudinous and the
BIA remanded the case for further consideration.1 16  A court
applying the modified categorical approach would be free to
consider the record of conviction, which would include the
charging elements of the offense."' Since moral turpitude is not
an element of "indecency with a child" in Texas, the record of
conviction provides little or no assistance to the court. 158
Allowing the courts to determine whether the defendant knew
154 See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 15.
156 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 692 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008).
157 Id. at 699.
15 See id. at 688, 692.
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the age of the victim, which, if he did, would most certainly be a
strong indicator of moral turpitude, can only be accomplished by
going beyond the record of conviction. 159
Courts should recognize the subjective nature of defining
crimes involving moral turpitude and embrace it. The moral
turpitude analysis is not likely to fit nicely within an objective
test in most cases, but that does not mean there cannot be a fair
method of interpretation. For example, courts undertake a
subjective inquiry when examining the beliefs of a victim
claiming self-defense to determine if that victim's acts were
excusable. 16 0  There are other subjective inquiries in trials, but
courts seem inexplicably uncomfortable with such an inquiry in
the immigration setting. Some courts, however, have recognized
and embraced this subjectivity when reviewing attorney
discipline proceedings dealing with moral turpitude.' 6' It is
important to note that those cases, like immigration cases, have
the potential for changing a person's life dramatically. While an
attorney may lose his livelihood, an immigrant may be deported
to a country where she no longer has familial ties or support of
any kind.162 Courts that need to resort to the third step under
Silva-Trevino will reach fairer and more uniform results because
they have the necessary information to answer the subjective
inquiry before them.
119 Id. at 703.
180 See, e.g., Gov't of the V.I. v. Robinson, 29 F.3d 878, 882 (3d Cir. 1994).
161 See, e.g., In re Fahey, 505 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Cal. 1973) ("The concept of moral
turpitude depends upon the state of public morals, and may vary according to the
community or the times."); In re Small, 760 A.2d 612, 613-14 (D.C. 2000)
(commenting that the defendant's conviction for negligent homicide and driving
while impaired in New York did not rise to the level of moral turpitude and courts
should consider 'the nature and circumstances of the misconduct for which the
attorney was disciplined"). The American Bar Association also recommends an
inquiry into the facts of each attorney discipline case dealing with moral turpitude.
See Rachna K. Dhanda, Note, When Attorneys Become Convicted Felons: The
Question of Discipline by the Bar, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 723, 727 (1995) (noting
that the Clark Committee on attorney discipline recommended courts consider "the
nexus between a particular crime and an attorney's fitness to practice, [so that they]
are better equipped to impose discipline that is appropriate for an attorney's
misconduct").
162 The Supreme Court has likened deportation to "exile" or "banishment." See
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing Fong
Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
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CONCLUSION
The concept of moral turpitude has been a mainstay in
United States Immigration law for over a century. While it
would be best to move away from legislation that is based on
morality, it is unlikely that Congress will abandon this language
any time soon. Immigration removal proceedings have incredibly
high stakes and it is essential that they are uniform and fair
across the country. The approach developed through case law
prior to Silva-Trevino that courts continue to apply offers neither
uniformity nor fairness.
Courts enforcing the INA should give the Attorney General's
opinion deference. The statute is ambiguous because the term
"moral turpitude" is subjective and because of the absence of any
procedure for determining what constitutes moral turpitude. The
opinion in Silva-Trevino is not an impermissible construction of
the statute and it addresses many of the deficiencies caused by
the patchwork development of judicial tests through case law.
The courts that have rejected the Silva-Trevino framework are in
direct conflict with binding precedent in the Chevron decision.
Fundamental fairness is a hallmark of the United States
justice system. It is unacceptable for courts to reach wildly
differing opinions about the same substantive area of the law.
Moreover, it is not the judiciary's job to determine immigration
policy. Congress expressly delegated interpretation of the INA to
the Attorney General. The office of the Attorney General acted
within its power and attempted to solve the problem of differing
approaches in Silva-Trevino. Since courts refuse to adopt this
approach, it is likely that this issue will eventually reach the
Supreme Court, which should affirm Silva-Trevino in light of
Chevron.
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